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United States-Japan EconomicRelations
A B S T R A CT
The bilateral relationshipwith Japan now dominates American thinking on the benefits and costs offoreign trade. This paper reevaluates the past and futurecourse of U.S.-Japan economic relations.It identifies six distinctaspects of the
relationship that may underlie thecontinuing friction: bilateral imbalance on merchandisetrade, capital flows from Japan to the United States, the
yen/dollar exchange rate, sectoral trade distortions,
Japan's technological catch-up, and societal differences. For eachsource of conflict, the main causes and potential remediesare assessed.
Several important conclusionsemerge from the analysis.
First, although the bilateral tradeand capital-account imbalances were producedprimarily by macroeconomic factors and can therefore be viewed as"temporary" rather than long-term
developments, elimination of the imbalanceswithout serious damage may be difficult to achieve.In terms of sectoral
adjustments, the U.S.-Japanrelationship is entering a new phase as the two nations grow more similarin terms of technology base,
abundance of capital and skilledlabor, and per capita income. Two-way trade in technology and intechnologybased services will
become increasingly important,while both nations willcope with similar problems of adjustmentto pressure from a new tier of competitors in Asia and elsewhere. As theaggregate imbalances diminish, sectoral trade conflict willbe Concentrated on the two ends of the technologyspectrum, with issues raised both by
conflicting approaches to the phasingout of uncompetitive




Waltham, MA 02173October 1987
UNITED STATES-JAPAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Rachel McCulloch
Brandeis University and NBER
The bilateral relationship with Japan now dominates American
thinking on the benefits and costs of foreign trade. Japan has
become the model of all things modern and efficient, the standard
against which the United States measures its own economy and
finds itself wanting. But Japan is also firmly established as
the villain in the industrial adjustment woes that have plagued
the United States in recent years; most Americans remain unaware
that Japan has encountered many of the same difficulties in
reducing excess capacity, often in the same industries.
Such paradoxes typify the intense and stormy relationship
between the world's economic superpowers. Against a background
of ever-increasing bilateral imbalances, ever-escalating
protectionist rhetoric, and even some action at the official
level, individual Americans continue to vote with their dollars
for still more Japanese imports. Can U.S. producers hope to
reverse the trend? Can American consumers be persuaded to give
up their Toyotas and their Sonys in favor of domestic goods?
These questions are themselves rapidly becoming obsolete. Thanks
to the recent flood of Japanese direct investments into U.S.
manufacturing industries, it is now often possible to "buy
American" without sacrificing Japanese design and quality.2
This paper reevaluates the past and future course of U.S.-
Japan economic relations. The first section asks whether there
is indeed a "Japan problem" and, if so, exactly what that problem
is. Section 2 examines the macroeconomic roots of the U.S.-
Japan bilateral trade imbalance and weighs alternative
macroeconomic remedies. Section 3 deals with trade issues at the
sectoral level. Section 4 reviews the technological rivalry
between the United States and Japan. Section 5 draws some
conclusions and looks to the future of the relationship.3
1. Is There a Japan Problem?
Given the surfeit of recentwritings, both scholarly and
popular, on the unprecedented size andcontinuing growth of the
U.S. -Japan trade imbalance, itmay seem odd to ask what the
problem is, let alone whether aproblem exists. Yet in some
important respects, Japan is perhaps betterseen as part of the
solution rather than the source ofthe problem. To see why, it
is helpful to examine the variousaspects of the U.S. -Japan
economic relationship thatmay underlie the continuing friction.
Here there are at least sixpossible candidates:
(1) Growing bilateral imbalanceon merchandise trade,
Particularly on trade in manufacturedgoods
(2) Growing net capital inflows fromJapan to the United
States
(3) The yen/dollar exchange rateand perhaps also the
present system of exchange-rate determination
(4) Sectoral nontariff barriers(whether real or imagined)
limiting Japanese imports of U.S.products and Japanese
trade-distorting industrial policies, andexport
incentives depriving U.S. firms ofsales at home and in
third- country markets
(5) Successful emulation byJapan of the technological
supremacy of U.S. industry
(6)Social, economic, political, and culturaldifferences
between the two nations.4
These categories are not mutually exclusive. Automotive
products loom so large in total bilateral trade that this
"sectoral" issue necessarily has implications for aggregate
imbalances. The narrowing technological gap is intimately linked
to the sectoral composition of trade and is itself affected by
Japanese policies to promote economic growth. And while cultural
and social conditions in, say, Indonesia are equally exotic to an
American observer, Americans are much more interested in --and
worried about -- contrastsbetween Japan and the United States
precisely because of the growing economic rivalry. Still, it is
helpful to sort out the relative importance of each type of
irritant and to examine the main causes and potential remedies in
each.
1.1. Aggregate imbalance
Highly aggregated measures of bilateral interaction are
regarded by most economists as the visible "symptoms" of
underlying macroeconomic conditions --and,specifically,
caused either by defects of trade or industrial policies at home
or by skillful application of the same abroad. While the
symptoms are themselves problematic, the causes and thus the
effective potential remedies are to be found at the macroeconomic
level. Yet the justification of every new proposal for trade
legislation prominently features the latest hitherto unimaginable
data on the nation's global external imbalance and bilateral
deficit with Japan -- withthe strong implication that tough new5
trade policies (or creativenew competitiveness policies)are the
measures required for the United Statesto redress the present
imbalance.
1.2. Capital inflows
Matching Japanese global surpluseson merchandise trade and
current account are massive foreigninvestments. The recent
rates have been rivaled only by thepetrodollar flood of the
l970s. But the petrodollars
were recycled primarily through the
Eurodollar market and wentultimately to many borrowers. In
contrast, Japanese funds (autodollars?) havein large measure
moved directly into U.S. financialmarkets. Thus, while there is
no conceptual reason why the nation'slargest bilateral
merchandise trade deficit and itslargest bilateral capital-
account surplus should be with thesame trading partner, it is
certainly true in this instance. If the oilsurpluses had
materialized later, or if U.S. fiscalpolicy had changed sooner,
it is likely that more liabilitiesof the U.S. Treasury wouldnow
be held by Saudi Arabia, andfewer by Japan.
The rapidly growing U.S. officialdebt to foreigners (or,
indeed, to anyone) raises importantissues of intergenerational
equity. However, the concerns ofmany Americans focus on one
particular component of the capitalinflows, direct foreign
investments in U.S. industries. Onone hand, state and local
officials vie to attract newinvestments --jobsand the future
tax base are the main reasons. Butdomestic firms worry about6
new competition as well as the effects on their own labor costs
and taxes.
Apparently oblivious to U.S. official insistence on national
treatment by foreign governments for American subsidiaries
abroad, the president of Ford Motor Company called in early 1987
for further reductions in auto imports from Japan, to compensate
for increased production by Japanese plants in the United States.
In the troubled U.S. semiconductor industry, national security
concerns were raised in objection to the proposed acquisition of
Fairchild Semiconductor by Fujitsu, Japan's largest computer
1
company.
1.3. The dollar/yen exchange rate
The exchange rate, too, is viewed by economists as
fundamentally a symptom rather than a cause. However, the
relationships determining exchange-rate movements are poorly
understood. Professional opinion remains divided particularly on
the appropriate role and effectiveness of official intervention
in foreign-exchange markets, either directly, via purchases or
sales of foreign exchange, or indirectly, via manipulation of
discount rates.
Through 1985, dollar strength offered a plausible
explanation of the nation's growing deficit on merchandise trade.
1In August 1987, National Semiconductor Corporation
announced that it would buy Fairchild -- atwhat industry
analysts described as a bargain price, far less than that offered
earlier by Fujitsu. National was one of several U.S. companies
that opposed the sale to Fujitsu.7
But the subsequent dramaticdecline in the dollar failedto
induce a correspondingturnaround in U.S. trade performance.
Analysts then rushed in to explain thenon-event with traditional
J-curves and newer "hysteresis"effects. While differing in
their microeconomicunderpinnings, both theoriessuggest that for
foreign trade, what goesup does not necessarily come down,or at
least not as quickly aspolicymakers would like. As a resultof
continuing growth in the U.S. tradedeficit, a yen/dollar
exchange rate of 160, seen in 1986by American officials as an
appropriate policy target, had givenway to target values of 140
or below by mid-1987.
1.5. Who's the problem?
While the domesticconsequences of large bilateral
imbalances and major exchange-ratemovements surely constitute
unsolved problems for U.S.policymakers, it is difficult to make
a convincing case that the basicfault lies with the Japanese
rather than elsewhere. True, theimbalances reflect mismatch
between the macroeconomicconditions and policies ofJapan and
the United States. But if themain problem is simply thelarge
aggregate imbalance, the main cause ismacroeconomic policy in
the United States.
Indeed, only Japan's offsettingsurpluses permitted the U.S.
economy to enjoy moderate growth during thel980s while
continuing on an unchanged macroeconomiccourse.In retrospect,
perhaps the United States should havealtered its fiscal policies8
sooner. Does that mean Japan is at fault for leaving the United
States "free to choose" instead of being forced to confront
immediately the full implications of its actions?
1.6. Sectoral distortions
Although customarily raised along with the issue of growing
bilateral imbalance, sectoral trade distortions present a
conceptually different type of problem for the United States.
The primary effect of such policies is to reduce the mutual
benefits from trade based on comparative advantage. While
individual firms and even industries often stand to gain from
distortive sectoral policies, national gains from export
promotion or import restriction are likely to be the exception
rather than the rule.2
The conclusion that trade policies, whether good or bad,
affect mainly the composition of trade rather than the aggregate
balance stems from a general-equilibrium view of economic
activity. Simply put, although a trade policy may change the
balance of trade for a particular product or even an industry,
offsets arise via induced movements in exchange rates and input
costs, foreign retaliation, and other indirectchannels.3
2For a summary of the practical difficulties in using
trade policy tIstrategicallyt to promote national advantage, see
Richardson (1986).
See McCulloch and Richardson (1986, pp. 61-64). Although
protectionist measures are traditionally condemned as beggar-thy-
neighbor policies, in reality they often turn out to be beggar-
thy-brother policies, impairing performance of other industries
in the same country. This is an important distinction for public9
Likewise, any positive employmenteffects in a specific
sector are offset by reducedemployment opportunities in other
areas. Moreover, to the extent thatthe jobs "saved" are in
relatively inefficient firms or inactivities where the United
States has lost comparativeadvantage, the overall composition of
employment opportunitiesmay be adversely affected.4 Still, this
does not alter the importanteconomic and political issuesraised
by the distribution of thegains from maintainingrelatively open
international markets.
A separate concern is thechanging composition of U.S.
production. If the level of domesticactivity in particular
manufacturing industries has importantpositive effects on other
parts of the economy, loss of marketshare in such "strategic"
activities could reduce futureU.S. industrial competitiveness
across the board. No clear evidenceof such externalities isyet
available, but some fear that further
delay in reversing present
servants, who seem relativelyunconcerned about costs inflicted outside the nation's (oreven the congressional district's) borders. For some examples ofundercutting indirect effects of trade policies, see Baldwin(1982).
An Opposite argument issometimes made by analysts concerned about deindustrializationof the U.S. economy.They believe that foreigntargeting of basic and hightechnology
manufacturing industries reduces u.s.employment opportunities in "high-valueatI activities. Buthigh value-added per worker may simply reflect firms' optimizingresponses to strong unions, rather than a technologicalcharacteristic of the industry.It is far from obvious that
national policy ought to bolsterthe
resulting wage advantage by limitingimports. In the case of
steel, probably the industry mostfrequently targeted worldwide, employment in the United States andother industrialized countries has dropped
dramatically while wages remain wellabove the U.S. average forcomparable skills and experience.10
trends may leave the United States at a permanent competitive
disadvantage.
1.7. How important are trade distortions?
The existence of subtle trade-distorting policies and
industrial practices on the part of Japan is acknowledged by
almost all international economists. The more interesting
question is how important such policies are in shaping the
overall relationship between Japan and the rest of the world, and
particularly with the United States. While there are differences
of opinion concerning the importance of such distortions to the
performance of individual sectors (see, for example, Borrus and
Zysman, 1985), there is broad agreement that the consequences for
the size of the aggregate imbalance are minor.
Even when there are significant benefits to be achieved by
negotiating reductions in sectoral trade distortions, it is
crucial that this task be divorced from the more pressing
macroeconomic issues.5 The persistent linkage of aggregate and
sectoral issues allows policymakers to delay needed macroeconomic
remedies and promotes U.S. allegations of bad faith on the part
of Japanese officials when inappropriate means fail to achieve
their stated ends.
Moreover, even the existence of a real distortion does
not assure that "corrective" policies will actually make things
better rather than worse. Examples such as textiles and apparel,
steel, autos, and semiconductors suggest that cartelization, not
active competition based on comparative advantage, is the likely
outcome of sectoral policy initiatives.11
1.8. Thchno1ogjca rivalry
Perhaps most significant to thelong-range development of
the U.S. -Japan relationship isthe successful emulationby Japan
of American technology.basedeconomic growth. Whilemany nations
have sought to close thetechnology gap with the United States,
only Japan has come so far so fast.Once primarily an importer
and adapter of technologiesdeveloped elsewhere, Japan now rivals
the United States inmany areas of industrial innovation.
Japan's challenge to Americantechnological supremacy has
important implications for thecomposition of bilateral trade
flows. Through much of thepost-World War II period, access to
superior technology allowed the UnitedStates to compete
effectively on world markets whilemaintaining average wages well
above those abroad. U.S.industrial exports wereincreasingly
concentrated in the hightechnologyindustries, while the
remainder of U.S. manufacturing lostground to foreign suppliers.
But with the loss of its decisivetechnological lead, U.S.
industry can no longer compete on the basisof unique products or
advanced processes alone. Asa consequence, earnings in U.S.
manufacturing are becoming more closely linkedto those in Japan
and other nations withaccess to advanced technologies andto the
capital required to implement them.
Another long-term issue is theinfluence of the "Japanese
model" of industrial developmenton policy choices of developing
nations, especially in Asia. Does thefuture hold "many Japans"12
competing with the United States in world markets? South Korea
is often labeled the next Japan because of its successes in
promoting the same export industries --successesfostered in
part by North American and European trade discrimination directed
at Japan's most competitive export industries. Nationalistic
Koreans reject the implied linkage with its one-time oppressor
but often privately admire Japan's economic strategy. Other
newly-industrializing nations are also studying Japan's
industrial policy and in some cases adopting certain elements.
The spectre of a world economy dominated by many nations all
saving, innovating, and exporting at Japanese rates raises
obvious concerns in the West.
Beyond the important but narrow issue of increased
competition in high-technology manufacturing industries, the
challenge to the U.S. lead in scientific and technological areas
may have implications for the nation's key role in global
security systems. This latter issue is linked to the ambivalence
of the United States and its allies regarding increases in
Japan's military expenditures. Japan's military budget for 1987
broached the "one percent threshhold" relative to gross national
product for the first time since the end of World War II.
1.9. Being different
The final but by no means minor problem area in U.S. -Japan
relations arises from the myriad social, political, and economic
structures of the Japanese nation that contrast so sharply with13
their U.S. counterpartsWhile the net contributionof these
differences to relativeeconomic performance and to thebilateral
imbalances remains largely inthe realm of conjecture,many
serious suggestions forrelieving tensions between the two
nations are based on effortsto reduce these differences,whether
by making the United Statesmore like Japan (highersavings,
quality circles, a Cabinet1evelDepartment of Trade and
Industry) or by making Japanmore like the United States
(deductability of mortgage interest,shorter work week, bigger
defense budget). Madeforcefully, such suggestions in effect
challenge the relevance of traditionalnotions of national
sovereignty in an increasingly interdependent
world economy.
The importance of themany departures of Japanese
governmental and business practice fromWestern norms remains an
area of controversy evenamong scholars. Overall, political
scientists such as Johnson(1982) seem more willing than
economists to attribute Japaneseindustrial and tradesuccesses
to unique structural features.But even economists are divided
on the importance of Japaneseindustrial policy andgovernment
firm relationships incomparison to a high savings rateas key
factors underlying the"Japanese miracle."
Contrasting economic and politicalsystems also complicate
the narrower issue of whatconstitutes a level playing fieldin
trade and investment matters.Allegations of sectoral trade
distortions often arise fromdifferences in administrative
structure and industrial
organization. So far, neither u.s.14
trade law nor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
has been able to deal effectively with the resulting disputes.
Bilateral negotiations and ad hoc agreements, often short-lived,
remain the major approach for addressing U.S.-Japan sectoral
trade conflicts.
A darker side of the contrasts between the two nations lies
below the surface. The overt U.S. racism of the World War II era
has receded, but subtle racism is a plausible explanation for the
very different official and private attitudes of Americans toward
Japan (and the newly-industrializing "four little dragons" of
Asia) and toward Canada or Europe. Government officials and the
media pass up no opportunity to remind the public of the
gargantuan U.S. deficit on trade with Japan, but how many
Americans realize that the nation's second largest bilateral
deficit is on trade with Canada?6
However, racial prejudice is a two-way street, as Prime
Minister Nakasone's well-publicized gaffe in 1986 amply
demonstrated. In a nation where careful checks of ancestry are
part of the usual preparation for marriage, many Japanese
privately view the eclipse of U.S. industrial might as the
inevitable consequence of its ethnic and racial diversity.
On this last score there may be grounds for some modest
6Relative to gross national product, the Canadian surplus
on trade with the United States actually exceeds Japan's. But in
early 1987, Canadian government statisticians showed that U.S.
recording procedures have systematically missed certain U.S.
exports, particularly those transported by truck into Canada.
U.S. statistics have thus overstated the U.S. merchandise trade
deficit and particularly the bilateral deficit with Canada.15
optimism The intensification ofeconomic ties between the United
States and Japan haspromoted a great desire on thepart of each
nation for betterunderstanding of the other. Even if the
primary motivation on each sidesprings from the lure of a large
and lucrative foreignmarket, the resulting familiaritywith a
Previously alien and inscrutiblesociety can help to smooth those
frictions based on differencesalone.16
2.Macroeconomic Roots of U.S. International Imbalance
Like an economic Sputnik, the rapid growth of the U.S. trade
imbalance galvanized the American public. To many observers,
escalation of the U.S. trade deficit in the l980s was simply
tangible and dramatic evidence of the nation's declining
industrial competitiveness, in turn reflecting erosion of the
commanding lead in science and technology the United States once
enjoyed. Others variously sought explanations in trade-
distorting practices abroad, export disincentives at home, and
poor management practices of U.S. companies. Likewise, Japan's
ever-increasing surpluses were interpreted either as evidence of
Japanese bad faith in complying with agreements to open its
markets to foreign goods or as confirmation of the wisdom of
Japanese private and public economic management.
Each explanation spawned a detailed agenda of private and
public action designed to arrest the decline. As with any broad
policy initiative, both wise and foolish proposals have been
advanced in the name of increased competitiveness. But for
reasons discussed below, most of these proposals would do nothing
to reduce the aggregate imbalance.7
2.1. The U.S. budget deficit
While the competitiveness frenzy continued unabated, an
McCulloch (1985) and McCulloch and Richardson (1986)
examine in detail the types of policies usually recommended to
restore U.S. competitiveness and evaluate their likely effects
(or lack of effects) on the nation's overall trade balance or
current account.17
alternative analysis offereda very different assessment of the
forces underlying rapid escalationof the U.S. trade deficit.
According to this view, promoted asearly as 1982 by the Council
of Economic Advisors, thegrowth of the trade deficit was the
largely predictable result of asingle important macroeconomic
development in the United States:a major increase in the size
of the federal budget deficit.The correspondingprescription
for restoration of U.S.competitiveness: cut the budget deficit.
The Council's macroeconomic
explanation, initially met by
disbelief and even ridicule,gained broad acceptance as the
continued tandem rise of the "twindeficits" offered further
circumstantial evidence insupport of a linkage. The basic
insight was, at least after the fact,a rather simple one. The
large increase in the federal deficittranslated into a
comparable drop in the nation's totalsaving, pushing up U.S.
interest rates. Drawn inby higher rates, foreign funds filled
the gap. But the foreign demandfor U.S. assets also droveup
the value of the dollar,pricing U.S. goods out ofmany markets
at home and abroad. Thus, ratherthan crowding out domestic
capital formation as some hadinitially feared, the larger
federal deficit crowded outdomestic production of tradable
goods.
Like most simple explanations,this one was too simple. The
analysis focused on the U.S. demand forforeign funds but
slighted important factors thatinfluenced the supply of those
funds to the U.S. market.While the enlarged federaldeficit18
alone would have put upward pressure on domestic interest rates
and promoted U.S. capital inflows, the actual size of those
inflows was also the result of important "supply" factors in
international capital markets.
2.2. Capital inflows and exchange rates
In addition to its neglect of factors influencing the supply
of funds to U.S. borrowers, the conventional wisdom implied that
the appreciation of the dollar was a necessary consequence of the
inflow of foreign funds. In fact, the theoretical consequences
of a financial transfer for the exchange rate are ambiguous,
depending crucially on spending patterns at home and abroad. The
more similar those spending patterns and the larger the
proportion of total expenditure devoted to tradable goods, the
less the exchange rate would have to move to "effect" the
transfer of current purchasing power to the United States.
Thinking in these terms helps to explain how the dollar
could fall so much with capital inflows still rising. The
prolonged period of a very strong dollar caused permanent changes
in consumer information and in producer costs of serving the U.S.
market. Specifically, at a given exchange rate, more U.S.
consumers would choose foreign products over their domestic
counterparts when priced comparably in dollars, while foreign
producers would be able to set lower dollar prices for goods
aimed at the U.S. market. Both types of changes are hysteresis
effects. They rest on once-and-for-all changes in demand and19
supply conditions, rather than the short-termsluggishness,
especially of demand, that underlies theJ-curve analysis.8
2.3. Thesupplyof foreign funds
If growth in the federalbudget deficit explains thegreatly
increased U.S. appetite forforeign funds, it is only one ofmany
reason why foreign lenders stoodready to satisfy that appetite.
Other factors influencing thesupply of foreign funds to U.S.
capital markets can be grouped into threecategories. Of these,
two apply to lendersgenerally (including U.S. lenders, whocut
back their own foreign loans infavor of domestic alternatives),
while the third is specific to themost important foreign lender,
Japan:
(1) Increased attractiveness ofU.S. investments,
reflecting, among others, enhanced taxincentives for
capital formation, financial and industrial
deregulation, repeal of the withholdingtax on earnings
of U.S. assets held byforeigners, and successful anti-
inflationary macroeconomic polic ies
(2) Reduced attractiveness oflending abroad, due to
economic stagnation in much ofEurope and the debt
problems and capital flightaffecting many less-
developed countries
(3) Increased capital outflows fromJapan, resulting from
8
On supply-side hysteresis effectsarising from economies of scale and sunk costs,see Baldwin (1986).20
liberalization of restrictions on capital outflows
(accelerated at the request of the United States as
part of the 1984 dollar-yenagreement9) and lower
Japanese budget deficits.
Even without the large increase in U.S. federal deficits, these
factors would have tended to push the U.S. capital account toward
surplus, putting upward pressure on the international value of
the dollar and downward pressure on U.S. merchandise trade
performance.
2.4. Stock adjustments and continuing flows
A further complication in the link between the U.S. budget
deficit and U.S. borrowing from abroad is that the rise in the
deficit created an ongoing demand for foreign capital, while the
inflows from abroad have reflected both one-time readjustments of
asset holdings in response to new market conditions and ongoing
supply effects. In the specific case of capital inflows from
Japan, the liberalization of capital outflows resulted in a
sizable shift of accumulated Japanese assets into U.S. securities
with higher yields. But the chronic surplus of Japanese private
savings over domestic absorption of those savings (by domestic
capital formation or government deficit spending) translates into
an ongoing supply influence that can be expected to push new
See Frankel (1985) for a review of this agreement. The
agreement was promoted as a means to raise the valueof the yen
by increasing its role as a reserve currency. However, the
predictable short-run result, borne out by subsequent events, was
just the opposite.21
capital into world markets year afteryear.
Over time, the resulting increases inforeign holdings of
U.S. assets and in U.S. holdings offoreign assets have direct
implications for the composition of thecurrent account and for
the relative value of the dollar. Therising net indebtedness of
the United States should meanrising net outflows of interest and
profits, pushing the U.S. services accounttoward deficit. For a
given level of net capital inflow,rising debt service entails a
shrinking deficit on merchandise trade and lessupward pressure
on the value of the dollar.'0 Thiscompositional effect within
the balance of payments would tendto reinforce the influence of
hysteresis on equilibrium exchange rates.
2.5. Correcting theaggregate imbalance
Given the full set of contributingmacroeconomic conditions,
what can be said about the outcomes ofalternative corrective
policies? The U.S. external imbalance reflectsan excess of
total "absorption" -- spending(public plus private) for both
consumption and investment purposes --overproduction in the
United States, and acorresponding shortfall of absorption
relative to production abroad. Measuresto reduce the imbalance
can seek to reduce the U.S. spendingexcess or to reduce the
10
The assumption that net capital inflowsare independent
of current earnings on past investmentsis, however, suspect. Tax law in the United States andsome other nations tends to
favor reinvestment abroad ofcurrent earnings from foreign
investments. Other governmental policiestoward international
capital transactions may also link the rate ofnew investment to current interest and profits.22
foreign shortfall.
2.5.1. Reducing U.S. absorption
The most obvious choices for direct U.S. action have become
the bread and butter of national policy debate: raise taxes, cut
government spending, or both. A third alternative for bringing
total U.S. spending into line is to reduce domestic capital
formation. This option, seldom explicitly considered, has
obvious negative implications for the future growth of U.S.
productive capacity. However, it may be chosen by default if
policymakers are unable to cut total public and private spending
for other purposes, or if new taxes enacted to reduce the deficit
also reduce incentives for domestic investment.
Moreover, even a successful effort to reduce the budget
deficit need not produce a comparable reduction in the nation's
demand for capital imports. Although customarily described in
terms of the increased federal deficit, the root of the nation's
increased appetite for foreign funds (or, equivalently, of its
increased deficit on current account) is actually increased
spending --specifically,the increase in total domestic
absorption of goods and services. Because changes in the federal
government's plans for taxing and spending usually have important
effects on decisions of state and local governments and of the
private sector, merely reducing the federal deficit does not
necessarily have a comparable effect on total absorption; major23
offsets are possible.11
2.5.2. Raising foreign absorption
As a practical matter, progress on deficitreduction has
been slow in coming, and conflicts betweenPresident Reagan and
the Democratica11ycontrolled U.S.Congress are likely to make
things even more difficult in 1987 and 1988.Meanwhile, Treasury
Secretary James Baker III has pushed U.S. tradingpartners,
especially West Germany and Japan, to assume moreresponsibility
for effecting the desired adjustment. In thecase of Japan,
proposals have focused on means to reduce theJapanese savings
surplus by increasing domestic consumption and investment
spending. This could perhaps be accomplished bygeneral economic
stimulation, but the prospects are most favorable fornarrowly-
targeted policies intended to raise specificcomponents of
Japanese spending.
The two areas mentioned most often in thisconnection are
housing and public works. For housing, relatively modestchanges
in Japanese tax laws and financialregulation could make
mortgage-financed owner-occupied housing far more attractivethan
it is today, thereby presumablyincreasing total expenditures in
11
An ongoing debate concerns the relative effectsof tax- financed and bond-financedgovernment expenditures. The issues
are complex, hinging on such imponderablesas the public's
anticipation of future changes in tax rates. Anextreme view is
that, because of public anticipation of futuretax liability,
bond-financed spending has the same overall effecton today's absorption as tax-financed spending.24
that category and probably overall.12
Increased government spending for highways, railroads, and
especially sewers is a second potential area of expanded domestic
absorption. By Western standards, Japanese spending in these
areas is surprisingly low. Fewer than three Japanese households
in five are connected to a central sewer system; incredibly, the
ratio is only about four out of five even in the Tokyo/Yokohama
area, one of the world's most densely populated urbancenters.13
But second-guessing such domestic spending decisions seenis of
doubtful efficacy, and of even more doubtful appropriateness.
One last area for a major increase in Japan's domestic
absorption is defense. Currently at a postwar high of just over
one percent of gross national product, Japan's defense
expenditures are, for example, only about half those of neutral
Switzerland and a third those of West Germany.14 Other major
U.S. allies spend still more. Should the United States urge
Japan to share more of the collective burden of global security?
Viewed strictly on its economic merits, this seems a more
appropriate area than housing or sewers for pressure from other
12Saxonhouse (1985) characterizes the Japanese as
"notorious target savers," with future housing a main target.
This is a critical point, since increased spending in any one
category does not necessarily translate into higher overall
spending (lower saving). Saxonhouse also notes a possible bonus
from increased housing expenditures for other spending: more
living space may lift a major constraint on purchases of
consumer durables.
13Japan 1986, p. 88.
14Japan 1986, p. 86.25
nations. However, proposals for a substantial increase in
Japanese defense spending have so far encountered formidable
political resistance both in Japan and in the United States.
While acknowledging that Japan's capital account surplus
mirrors the nation's imbalance between saving and domestic
spending, some analysts believe that the underlying macroeconomic
imbalance is not appropriately viewed as exogenous. Rapp (1986)
and Balassa (1986) link high Japanese savings to profits
generated by sectoral protection. If this effect were
quantitatively important, import liberalization would, in
addition to its expected effects on sectoral composition of trade
flows, raise Japanese domestic absorption and thus reduce the
aggregate trade surplus.
2.5.3. Redirecting foreign funds
If the United States doesn't want Japan's capital surpluses,
perhaps other borrowers do. An important alternative to
increasing Japanese domestic absorption is redirecting Japan's
foreign lending toward other nations, especially less-developed
nations. Debt problems have led many developing nations to
restrict imports of capital equipment supplied by the United
States and other industrial nations. With more purchasing power
at their disposal, these nations would be able to resume such
imports; U.S. exporters would benefit accordingly.
In the past decade Japan has increased by nearly 50 percent
its share of CNP devoted to official development assistance,26
while the U.S. share, initially the same (0.24 percent), remained
unchanged. 3ut compared to other prosperous nations, Japan's
spending is still on the low side.
Although the Japanese have in fact continued to step up
their spending for foreign aid, the increases have not always met
with cheers from other donor nations. The problem arises from
informal arrangements that link aid to expenditures for Japanese
goods and services. While little aid is explicitly tied, aid is
rarely committed without specific project plans; potential
borrowers rely on Japanese expert advice in formulating the
plans, which typically call for imports of Japanese capital
equipment and other products. Mixed-credit financing is a
related problem, although Japan has not been the major offender
in this area.
Commercial lending and direct foreign investments in
developing countries are another means by which Japanese surplus
savings could be "recycled." Given the ongoing debt problems of
many developing nations, this route currently looks hazardous to
both potential lenders and potential borrowers. In the longer
term, however, it is likely that "normal" capital-flow relations
between rich and poor nations will be reestablished, with funds
from Japan playing an important role.
2.5.4. Taxing capital imports
Only the net inflow of capital from abroad has kept the
greatly increased federal deficit from pushing U.S. interest27
rates through the roof. Instead, the U.S. trade deficit has gone
through the roof. Until U.S. domestic absorption can be cut, the
nation will continue to face the same basic choice between high
interest rates and foreign borrowing. Over time, the exact terms
of the trade-off will depend on investors' preferences, but the
United States can tilt that choice by taxing capital imports.'5
Controlling U.S. capital imports would shift a greater part
of the adjustment to higher deficits onto U.S. lenders and
borrowers, rather than allowing much of the "crowding out" to be
exported. From the U.S. perspective, the effect is similar to
what would be obtained via expansion abroad. However, there are
two potentially important differences. First, without specific
expansionary policies in place abroad, imposition of capital
controls by the United States could push the rest of the world
into a deflationary spiral. Second, and perhaps key for some
U.S. officials, capital controls would reverse recent U.S. gains
in penetrating foreign (especially Japanese) markets for
financial services.
15This has been proposed in recent years by James Tobin
and Rudiger Dornbusch, among others. See Dornbusch and Frankel
(1987).28
3.Sectoral Issues
Allegations about Japan's relatively closed markets for
industrial products reflect concerns of much longer standing than
the aggregate imbalances of recent years. The encroachment of
Japanese products into the U.S. market and their displacement of
U.S. exports in markets elsewhere is likewise an old story, not a
new one. However, emergence of a very large bilateral imbalance
has exacerbated those longtime concerns, since the impact of
competition with Japan is concentrated in a small number of U.S.
manufacturing industries.16
Bilateral friction on agricultural trade is also an old
story. However, with U.S. global surpluses on agricultural trade
shrinking rapidly, one consequence has been renewed focus on the
import barriers of Japan, already the largest market for U.S.
agricultural exports. Changes in Japan's current policies in
support of domestic agriculture, and especially of rice farming,
could mean still larger imports of food from the United States.
But, like other industrialized nations, Japan has so far found
reductions in its expensive agricultural support policies
politically unpalatable. Indeed, were the United States to
reform its own costly and distortionary policies toward
agriculture as it has urged the Japanese to do, any increase in
16Conversely, a return to a more "normal" pattern of
global capital flows should reduce sectoral frictions. Krugman
(1986) and Petri (1987) use this logic to anticipate some
reversal of recent competitive pressures on U.S. industry. Based
on simulation analysis, Petri concludes that output structures in
the United States and Japan could become quite similar by the
l990s.29
Japanese imports of rice might well come from Thailand or China
rather than from the United States.
3.1. Are exports and imports separate issues?
Are the issues raised by Japan's low imports and high
exports two separate concerns, or are they linked aspects of a
single developmental policy?Some argue that market closure,
along with government assistance for generic research and
development projects, was an essential element of the Japanese
national policy responsible for subsequent export successes in
motor vehicles and electronics.17
Moreover, as described in the previous section, Japan's
overall trade balance is determined largely by macroeconomic
influences. Any broad import-inhibiting factors, whether
national policy or industrial practice, ought therefore also to
inhibit exports. Conversely, any successful move to liberalize
imports will likewise promote exports -- althoughthis is hardly
a result U.S. trade negotiators are likely to stress.18
A third link between exports and imports arises from Japan's
poor endowment of natural resources. For any given trade balance
consistent with macroeconomic conditions, Japan's heavy
17For example, Borrus, Tyson, and Zysman (1987) make this
argument for the case of the semiconductor industry.
18If sectoral liberalization does reduce aggregate
Japanese savings, as suggested by Rapp (1986) and Balassa (1986),
the induced rise in Japanese exports would not fully offset the
rise in imports.30
dependence on imported oil and food means a correspondingly
larger surplus on trade in manufactures (or in services --but
Japan currently runs a deficit on services trade).19 Still, the
required surplus could be achieved through higher-than-average
manufactured exports, as in the case of West Germany, rather than
lower-than-average manufactured imports (Lawrence, 1987).
Perhaps more important than the direct effect on the
composition of Japan's trade flows, perennial dependence on
imports of raw materials and food has shaped national attitudes,
public and private, toward importing. To many Japanese, their
economy's extreme vulnerability to changes in global market
conditions both for raw-material imports such as oil and for
manufactured exports casts an omnipresent shadow over today's
prosperity.
3.2. Japan's low import share
In terms of conventional trade-distorting government
practices, Japan was formerly a major offender among industrial
nations but now must be counted as one of the most open.2°
19
Krugman (1986) links the "Japan problem" of rapidly
growth of manufactured exports to the United States to large
increases in world oil prices from 1973 until 1984. His analysis
suggests that lower oil prices will translate into a higher value
of the yen and slower growth of Japanese manufactured exports.
20
Komiya and Itoh (1986) provide a detailed accounted of
the gradual liberalization of Japanese imports. Saxonhouse
(1983, 1985) documents the minor importance currently of
conventional instruments of protection. Ahearn (1985) divides
current Japanese import barriers into four categories: formal,
regulatory, strategic, and business and cultural. He concludes
that the most onerous remaining barriers to manufactured imports31
Foreign products and services, from IBM to McDonald's, are to be
found everywhere. Yet the Japanese ratio of imports to gross
national product and especially of manufactured imports to total
imports remain strikingly low in comparison to other industrial
countries. Many of the "foreign" goods now so conspicuous in
Japanese daily life are in fact produced domestically by local
affiliates or licensees of foreign companies.
Are the low import ratios evidence of subtle trade barriers
or simply a reflection of transport costs and an atypical factor
endowment? Much of the evidence on Japan's "hidden" barriers to
entry is anecdotal (e.g., Rapp, 1986; Balassa, 1986). While
attesting to real frustrations experienced by U.S. producers in
their attempts to serve a potentially lucrative market, such
anecdotes provide little indication of whether public or private
action in Japan differs significantly from that in, say, France.
Christopher (1986) goes further, suggesting that while
disappointed would-be exporters have clear motives for making
their grievances known, successful U.S. exporters and direct
investors wisely shun publicity. Kept from the public eye, their
successes --andresulting profits --areless likely to promote
further entry by competing U.S. producers. If so, anecdotal
evidence may be a seriously biased measure of import barriers.
are in the last category, where Japanese public policy has
relatively little direct impact.32
3.3. Econometric evidence
Several researchers have used econometric methods to
determine whether Japan's trade structure is basically a
reflection of relative costs or has been shaped significantly by
hidden but important barriers to imports. Starting from standard
models linking trade patterns to national factor endowments and
other determinants of relative cost, these researchers examine
the deviations of actual trade flows from those predicted by the
underlying model.
While based on different specifications, data, and time
periods, studies by Saxonhouse (1983, 1985), Bergsten and Cline
(1985), and Noland (1987) all found Japanese trade to be
adequately explained by the same basic determinants as that of
other areas, thus rejecting a major role for import barriers in
Japan compared to its trading partners. In contrast, Zalassa
(1986) found significant shortfalls of Japanese imports relative
to values predicted from a model very similar to Bergsten and
Cline's. Noland conjectures that the conflicting results reflect
differences in the samples and in the definitions of the
independent variables but emphasizes that neither set of
regressions is derived from a formal model. Deviations of actual
from predicted values, ascribed by Balassa to trade policies
applied, may simply indicate misspecification of the regression
equation.
Noland 's own regression equations are derived from an
explicit two-sector model incorporating differentiated products33
and scale economies, an approach motivated by recent developments
in the theory of international trade (e.g., Helpman and Krugman,
1985). Despite the different theoretical underpinnings,Noland
draws basically the same conclusion as Saxonhouse and Bergsten
and Cline, that Japanese exports, imports, and total trade"do
not appear to be out of the ordinary." But in interpretinghis
own results as well as those of earlier researchers,Noland
emphasizes the need for caution in making any stronginference
from the size of residuals, given uncertainty as to specification
of the "true model."21
Although intended to cast light on the extent of Japan's
sectoral barriers to imports, the studies by Bergsten and dine,
Balassa, and Noland all used aggregate trade data,while
Saxonhouse employed industry data but focused on net exports
rather than imports. To focus directly on sectoral anomalies,
Lawrence (1987) used import, export, and production datafor 22
manufacturing industries. Like Noland, Lawrence adopted a
theoretical framework incorporating differentiated products and
scale economies. However, while Noland treated manufacturing as
a single sector, in the Lawrence model each manufacturing
industry produces a separate differentiated product.
21Leamer (1984) gives a more comprehensive discussion of
both specification issues and data problems associated with
empirically relating resource endowments to trade patterns,also
emphasizing the problem of sensitivity. While he acknowledges
the probable importance of scale economies, for practical reasons
his own specification is based on a model with constant returns.
Leamer does not focus on the existence of significant distortions
but concludes from his analysis that resource endowments provide
a "surprisingly good" explanation of the trade data.34
The critical step in Lawrence's analysis is the assumption
that tastes are similar across countries. With the additional
assumption of no transport costs or trade barriers, a country's
share in each market will then be proportional to its share in
world production and independent of the size of the aggregate
trade balance; larger countries will thus be more "closed" as
measured by trade flows as a share of GNP. The implied
relationship between a country's production and trade in each
industry is used by Lawrence to infer the existence of "unusual
barriers" to imports at the industry level.
Lawrence's data show that the industrialized countries are
remarkably similar in patterns of domestic production and use
(consumption plus investment) by industry. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom, Japan is not unusual in its overall export
performance, although Japan's manufactured exports are highly
concentrated in a small number of industries. But Japan j
atypical in its low manufactured imports and the very minor
extent of intra-industry trade. From his regression analysis of
industry trade and production data, Lawrence concludes that
"unusual barriers reduce Japanese imports of manufactured goods
substantially --byabout forty percent." As Lawrence notes, his
results are not inconsistent with Noland's finding of no
significant anomaly in Japan's aggregate trade. Since
manufactured goods were less than a quarter of Japan's total
imports in 1980, substantial "underimporting" in some sectors
could be masked by the use of aggregate data.35
Despite his striking result, Lawrencecasts doubt on
sectoral trade liberalization as a cure-allfor aggregate
imbalances, suggesting that the increasein manufactured imports
thereby produced would be largelyoffset by an associated rise in
exports. Thus, the main effectwould be an expansion of Japan's
intra-industry trade, rather than adramatic reduction in the
nation's surplus on trade in manufactured goods.A more basic
issue is, as with the earlier studies,the extent to which
Japan's import shortfalls fromLawrence's predicted values
reflect model misspecification or errorsin variables (e.g.,
transport costs, for which Lawrenceused mileage) rather than
import barriers.
3.4. Lack of intraindustrv trade
A somewhat different argument made byBorrus and Zysman
(1985) also takes as its starting point Japan'satypically low
level of intra-industry trade. Borrus and Zysman pointto the
virtual absence of two-way trade in specificmanufactured
products: Japan tends not to importthe manufactured goods that
it exports.
According to Borrus and Zysman, past protectionfrom imports
has allowed Japanese producers to achieve adecisive competitive
advantage. Indeed, the resulting advantageis so great that even
when import barriers are no longer in place, foreignfirms are
unable to penetrate the domestic market,while Japanese firms can
quickly displace other suppliers inthe United States and third-36
country markets.22 But Borrus and Zysman supply no evidence that
Japan's intra-product and intra-industry trade are systematically
depressed in sectors previously protected by import barriers.
Although the cases of semiconductors and autos are suggestive,
generalization to manufacturing as a whole requires further
support.
A more fundamental issue is, as with any ex post ergo
propter hoc argument, the lack of evidence establishing that past
protection of the Japanese domestic market from imports played a
key role in developing present technological superiority. If a
large and profitable market were the main necessary condition for
developing a decisive competitive advantage, U.S. automakers, not
Japanese, ought to dominate world markets today. That the
Japanese experience with import substitution actually ended with
internationally competitive production and termination of infant
industry protection makes it an exception to the global norm,
But if the Japanese experience is so different from what has been
observed with import substitution elsewhere, perhaps other
Japanese policies, not barriers to imports, were the essential
ingredient.
22Although Lawrence's data support the contention that
Japanese intra-industry trade in manufactured goods is unusually
low, he attributes this finding to remaining current barriers to
imports, not technological advantages resulting from past
protection.37
4.The U.S. Technology Race with Japan
A persistent technology gap between the United States and
other industrialized nations shaped the nation's trade in
manufactured goods for several decades after World War II. Over
this period, large public and private expenditures on research
and development created a continuing flow of new products and
processes. Early access to this superior technology allowed U.S.
firms to remain internationally competitive despite labor costs
far in excess of those abroad. As late as 1980, the U.S. trade
position in high-technology manufacturing was still rising almost
every year, while net trade in other manufacturing followed an
opposite trend.
4.1. Closing the technology gap
The breakdown of trading relationships based on U.S.
technological superiority reflected several major changes in the
global economic environment. First, other industrial nations,
impressed by U.S. economic gains from technology-driven growth,
stepped up their own R&D expenditures. Some of the funds went
for basic research, but much was used to speed the acquisition
and adaptation of technology from abroad, especially from the
United States. At the same time, dramatic improvements in
communications and transportation helped to internationalize both
research and production activities.
The growth of U.S. multinational corporations served as an
important vehicle for the international transfer of new38
commercial technologies, providing not only access to proprietary
technological information but also to the know-how and financial
capital needed to implement the new technologies. The
technology-disseminating activities of multinationals, while
profit-motivated, were in many cases actively encouraged by host
countries' policies toward direct investments.
The closing of the technology gap between the United States
and its commercial rivals meant increased competition on other
dimensions of cost. Labor productivity and earnings rose rapidly
abroad, while the growth of U.S. earnings slowed. Although the
catch-up abroad probably benefited the nation as a whole by
raising foreign demand for U.S. goods and services and by opening
the possibility of importing as well as exporting new
technologies, some U.S. workers clearly lost ground. In a number
of U.S. manufacturing industries, real earnings actually fell for
the first time in the postwar period as U.S. producers attempted
to remain internationally competitive.
4.2. Japan's technological development
In contrast to most other industrial nations, Japan
virtually excluded foreign investments in industries targeted for
development during its period of technological catch-up.
Instead, it relied primarily on licensing to acquire critical
technologies from abroad. Imports of technology were controlled
by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which
prepared lists of desired technologies and reviewed most39
licensing proposals.23 As a supplement to MITI's role as
"doorkeeper" to technology imports, the Ministry of Finance
insured access of innovating firms to financial capital.24
Some developing countries have modeled their own policies
toward imported technologies on those of Japan, particularly
screening of licensing agreements and allocation of capital.
However, none are in a position to duplicate the commitment of
skilled workers that facilited Japan's success in adapting
imported technologies. In 1969, two decades into its catch-up
phase, Japan employed about 30 scientists and engineers per
10,000 workers in the labor force, less than half the comparable
figure for the United States but comparable to the major European
nations.25 Fifteen years later the Japanese proportion of
scientists and engineers in the workforce had more than doubled,
closely approaching the United States figure, while the European
nations had more modest increases. Japanese spending for
research and development (R&D) tells a similar story. Although
23Harris (1985) gives a comprehensive review of past and
current Japanese policies toward international technology
transfers.
24Yamamura (1986) suggests that the role of the Ministry
of Finance (MOF) was perhaps the most essential element of
Japan's pro-growth policy in this period. Given the under-
developed state of Japanese domestic capital markets, their
insulation from world financial markets, and regulated below-
market-clearing interest rates on loans, MOF exercised enormous
economic leverage over domestic firms as a consequence of its
ability to allocate loans in a situation of chronic excess
demand.
25 . . NationalScience Foundation Science and Technology Data
Book 1987, pp. 37-38.40
Japan is only average among industrial nations in its overall
proportion of gross national product devoted to R&D, it now
enjoys the world's highest ratio of nondefense R&D to GNP.
As with trade in manufactured goods, Japan has in recent
years greatly liberalized its policies toward technology imports
while rapidly expanding its own technology exports. Japan's
"technological balance of payments," recording payments and
receipts of royalties and licensing fees for the use of
trademarks, copyrights, and patents, still shows a large deficit.
However, this is mainly a reflection of agreements made in
earlier years during Japan's catch-up phase. Japan'sgross
receipts from technology exports have grown steadily. By 1984
Japan was the third, after the United States and the United
Kingdom, in earnings from foreign use of its technology.26
Like other technologically advanced nations, Japan has also
increased its direct investments abroad, pairing financial
capital, superior technology, and managerial know-how with the
lower labor costs of developing countries. Current or
anticipated import barriers have provided the main motivation for
recent Japanese direct investments in the other industrialized
nations, but even these investments may entail substantial
transfers of technology.27 For Japanese investments in U.S.
high-technology industries, there is likely to be a two-way flow,
26
Japan 1986, p. 26.
27
Bhagwati (1982) has pointed out that some direct foreign
investments may be used to head off new protection rather than in
anticipation of producing inside the restricted market.41
with the Japanese gaining speedier access to state-of-the-art
technical information while themselves disseminating superior
methods of management and organization.
4.3. Japanese productivity and trade
Bilateral comparisons of industry-level productivity and
trade performance confirm Japan's catch-up to the technological
level of the United States. In their comparison of productivity
levels for 28 industries, Jorgenson, Kuroda, and Nishimizu (1986)
found that by 1979 nine Japanese industries had already closed
the productivity gap with the United States; in the remaining
nineteen industries the difference narrowed over the period
studied. The analysis indicated that Japan's rising productivity
levels were strongly influenced by major increases in the
relative capital intensity of production as well as improved
technology.
A recent study of U.S. -Japanese trade patterns in 1977
(Audrestch and Yamawaki, 1986) found bilateral U.S.-Japanese
trade structurally different from trade between the United States
and other countries. In contrast to the consistent empirical
result that U.S. export strength is greatest in the high-
technology industries with relatively large employment ofskilled
workers, U.S. trade performance in its bilateral trade with Japan
was negatively related to the skill level of the U.S.labor
force. A possible interpretation of this finding is that at
least in trade with Japan, the U.S. technological lead is no42
longer an important factor; an abundance of skilled workers and a
lower wage premium for technical skills can give Japan a cost
advantage over the United States in these industries.
However, the experience of Japanese-owned auto plants in the
United States has shown that neither massive capital investments
nor state-of-the-art technologies are essential ingredients of
the Japanese cost advantage, In autos, Japanese producers
operating in the United States have achieved lower costs than
their indigenous counterparts while typically using less capital
per worker and no highly advanced production technology. This
raises the possibility that at least in the auto industry, a
significant aspect of the Japanese competitive advantage is
"technological" only in a very broad sense that includes
organizational and managerial know-how.
But recent findings of Lipsey and Kravis (1986) suggest that
Japan's advantage in auto production may not be typical. In
terms of overall manufacturing exports, Lipsey and Kravis found
that U.S. multinational corporations have maintained avirtually
unchanged share of world totals since 1966; declining exports
from U.S. production have been offset by risingexports from
subsidiaries abroad. These results imply that loss of U.S.
international competitiveness in manufacturing as a whole cannot
be attributed to deficiencies in U.S. management skillsor
technology. However, in the case of transport equipment, the
United States did lose substantial ground; by 1983, both the43
United States as a country and U.S. multinationals had lost about
a quarter of their 1966 global marketshares.28
28The atypical performance of the auto industry relative
to U.S. manufacturing as a whole points up the danger in
generalizing from the experience of a single sector, even a very
important one, as Halberstam (1986) does in his comparisonof
Ford and Nissan.44
5. Looking Ahead
Japan's rapid growth during much of the postwar period has
been based on technological catch-up. Theslowing of that growth
in recent years reflects, among other things, thecompletion of
the catch-up phase. Can the Japanese policies and institutions
that facilitated successful importation and adaptation of
existing technologies work as well in producing new ones? Some
claim that the Japanese educational system, incomparison to its
American counterpart, ensures a uniformly high standard of
performance but systematically crushes individuality and
creativity. However, it is too early to judge whether these
differences have any implications for scientific innovation, and
in any case both systems are in the throes ofsignificant change.
The increasing economic intimacy between the two nations has
itself served as one major impetus for change.
I have argued that the rapidly growing bilateral imbalances
between the United States and Japan were producedby
macroeconomic conditions, not trade or industrial policies. In
this sense, the imbalances can be viewed as"temporary" factors
rather than long-term developments. But elimination of the
imbalances without serious damage to the U.S.economy and those
of its trading partners may be difficult to achieve.If Japanese
investors turn away from U.S. financial markets before theUnited
States is able to reduce domestic absorption, U.S. interestrates
will be forced upward, with potentially disastrousconsequences
for the economy.45
In terms of sectoral adjustments, the U.S.-Japanese
relationship may well be entering a new phase. As the nations
grow more similar in terms of technology base, abundanceof
capital and skilled labor, and per capita income, intra-industry
trade is likely to grow. In particular, two-way trade in
technology and in technology-based services should become
increasingly important as Japan moves from adaptation into
innovation. In the mature industries and even some that are now
considered "high-technology" sectors, both Japan and the United
States will be faced with increasing competition from a new tier
of competitors in Asia and elsewhere.
For both nations, problems of sectoral adjustment will
continue to generate strong pressures for import protection and
other forms of assistance to industries losing ground to
newcomers. Sectoral trade conflict between the United States and
Japan will be concentrated on the two ends of the industrial
spectrum in terms of technological sophistication, with issues
raised both by contrasting approaches to the phasing out of
industries losing their comparative advantage and by contrasting
approaches to the nurturing of new industries.
Could the United States return to its one-time position of
unquestioned technological preeminence? Even with vastly
increased resources allocated to research and development, this
kind of advantage probably can no longer be sustained -- bythe
United States or any country -- ina world that has become highly
interdependent. The commercial advantage of being first in46
innovation has been undermined by the greatly increased speed
with which new technical knowledge becomes available to potential
competitors all over the globe. This does not mean that research
and development has become less important. On thecontrary,
technological improvements will continue to provide the basis for
a rising standard of living both in the United States and abroad.
However, the benefits of R&D efforts can no longer be counted
mainly in terms of the advantages conferred to one nation's
industries over competitors elsewhere.